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I. INTRODUCTION
Nuclear weaponry first gave the United States the "biggest stick in the
[international] playground."' It is with little surprise, then, that some
members of the United States Senate should resist ratification of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty2 (CTBT or the Treaty), which
would, unlike any test ban treaty before it, compel the United States to cease
all methods of nuclear testing, and finally drop the "stick.",3 In 1999, the
Senate failed to reach even a majority in favor of the CTBT by a vote of 48-
51, much less the sixty-seven votes needed for ratification. Senators voted
largely along party lines, as Democrats sided with President Clinton in favor
of the Treaty against Republicans' steadfast, near unanimous opposition to
ratification.5
Arizona Senator Jon Kyl was instrumental in shepherding Republican
opposition to the CTBT in the lead-in to the 1999 vote.6 Kyl focused the
debate on three primary objections to the Treaty: that the Treaty is
unverifiable, that it would not curb nuclear proliferation, and that it would
undermine America's nuclear deterrent. Particularly with respect to
maintaining U.S. nuclear superiority, CTBT ratification might signal
weakness to allies and challengers as the United States would forever
foreswear nuclear testing, regardless of its motives to maintain a reliable,
though aging, nuclear arsenal.8 Testing, however, is crucial to ensuring that
1 FAT MAN AND LITTLE Boy (Paramount Pictures 1989).2 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, opened for signature Sept. 24, 1996, 35 I.L.M.
1439 [hereinafter CTBT].
3 See infra notes 29-32 and accompanying text (discussing the Limited Test Ban Treaty of
1963, the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, and the CTBT).
4 See David R. Sands, Shalikashvili to Lobby for Nuclear Test Ban Pact, WASH. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 2000, at A 15 (noting that the CTBT was nineteen votes short of ratification).
5 See Craig Cemiello, Senate Rejects Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; Clinton Vows to
Continue Moratorium, 29 ARMS CONTROL TODAY (1999), available at http://www.armscontr
ol.org/act/1999_09-10/ctbso99 ("Forty-four Democrats voted for ratification as did four
Republicans .... Fifty Republican senators and one independent... voted against
ratification .... ).
6 See Terry L. Deibel, The Death of a Treaty, 81 FOREIGN AFF. 142, 146-47 (2002)
(discussing Kyl's role in the opposition strategy, in which Kyl and others contacted similarly-
minded Republican senators to solicit votes, quietly orchestrating a campaign that collected
forty-two out of fifty-five Republican votes against the CTBT in a matter of weeks).
Jon Kyl, Maintaining "Peace Through Strength": A Rejection of the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 325, 326 (2000).
8 See KATHLEEN C. BAILEY, NAT'L INST. PUB. POLICY, COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN: THE
WORST ARMS CONTROL TREATY EVER (1999), available at http:J/www.nipp.org/National%20ln
stitute%20Press/Archives/Publication%20Archive%20PDF/oppiece.pdf (arguing that nuclear
testing is crucial to demonstrate to allies and potential enemies that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is
reliable); see also Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., Commentary, A Shrinking Deterrent: US. Increasingly
Seen As A Paper Tiger, WASH. TIMES, May 27, 2009, at 1 ("[President Obama's agenda
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these extremely complex weapons continue to function properly.9 During
senatorial debate, Senator Mike Enzi argued that verification problems set a
double standard because other countries may cheat "while the United States
would scrupulously adhere to the CTBT, thereby losing confidence in its
nuclear deterrent."'
0
President Barack Obama resurrected the CTBT as an issue of
considerable importance in the United States Senate. During an April 2009
speech in Prague, President Obama reiterated a campaign pledge,"
announcing that his "administration [would] immediately and aggressively
pursue U.S. ratification of the [Treaty]."' 2 Vice President Joe Biden, a key
member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the 1999
rejection of the CTBT, has been assigned the task of translating President
Obama's ratification pledge into the two-thirds vote required for ratification
of a treaty.
13
As in 1999, President Obama faces similar resistance to the ratification of
the CTBT. Senator Kyl, now the minority whip, is again leading Republican
senators in their opposition to the Treaty. 14 Once again, opponents challenge
the Treaty principally on concerns over verification and deterrence; 15
however, President Obama possesses significant advantages in his
ratification campaign. Democrats notably control fifty-seven seats in the
Senate 16 compared with only forty-five held seats in 1999.17 President
Obama also does not face some of the political challenges that worked
regarding ratification of the CTBT] will increase international perceptions of an America that is
ever less willing to provide for its own security.").
9 See Kyl, supra note 7, at 328 (arguing that complexity and twenty-year shelf lives of
American nuclear forces require periodic testing).
10 145 CONG. REC. 24,633 (1999) (statement of Sen. Mike Enzi).
1 Michael D. Shear & Colum Lynch, After Launch, Obama Focuses on Disarmament; N.
Korea Complicates President's Trip, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 2009, at Al.
12 John Isaacs, A Strategy for Achieving Senate Approval of the CTBT, BULL. OF ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS (Apr. 15, 2009), http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/strategy-achievin
g-senate-approval-of-the-ctbt.
13 id.
14 See id. ("The anti-treaty forces are led by two key Republican senators: John Kyl of
Arizona and Jeff Sessions of Alabama.").
15 See, e.g., Jon Kyl & Richard Perle, Our Decaying Nuclear Deterrent, WALL ST. J., June
29, 2009, at A13 ("[The test-ban treaty] simply is not verifiable. It also failed because of an
understandable reluctance ... to forgo forever a test program that could in the future be of
critical importance for our defense and the defense of our allies.").
16 See John Nichols, Can the Grand Old (Tea) Party Win in November?, NATION (Sept. 15,
2010, 4:36 PM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/154731/can-grand-old-tea-party-win-november
(noting that Senate Democrats hold fifty-seven seats, supported by two Independents).
17 See Deibel, supra note 6, at 147 (noting that all forty-five Democrats sent a letter to
former Foreign Relations Committee chairman, Jesse Helms, asking for release of the CTBT
from committee to face a floor vote).
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against former President Clinton, such as the partisan atmosphere
surrounding his impeachment proceedings. 8
Yet, as in 1999, it appears unlikely that the Obama administration will
acquire the sixty-seven votes necessary for ratification, as all Republican
senators indicate unwillingness to vote in favor of ratification.' 9 President
Obama will likely need to invest a large amount of political capital to secure
the seven to ten Republican votes necessary for ratification of the CTBT.2°
Although some conservative senators appear resolved against ratification, it
may be possible for the President to sway some moderate senators from
across the aisle.2' For example, key senators John McCain and Richard
Lugar have expressed some readiness to consider the CTBT.22 In particular,
the President must speak to concerns about nuclear deterrence and address
Republican support for a resumption of nuclear testing to garner the support
21that he needs for ratification.
The President could argue that the United States cannot lawfully break its
moratorium on nuclear testing, even in the absence of CTBT ratification.
This Note aims to contribute to that discussion by arguing that, if the issue
were to come before the court, the ICJ should find that American nuclear
testing is illegal. Such a ruling would establish a legal barrier to nuclear
testing similar to ratification of the CTBT and would otherwise impact the
18 See Jofi Joseph, Renew the Drive for CTBT Ratification, 32 WASH. Q. 79, 84 (2009)
(explaining that President Clinton faced a Republican majority that was highly skeptical of his
national security positions, some of which refused to accept him as commander in chief,
which negatively influenced political compromise on arms control agreements such as the
CTBT).
19 See James Kitfield, Road to Zero Nukes Remains Fraught, NAT'L J., May 30, 2009,
http://www.nationaljoumal.com/njmagazine/nj_20090530_1512.php (quoting John Isaacs,
Executive Director of the Center for Arms Control and the Non- Proliferation, as arguing that
Obama will need to find some bipartisan compromise, since all forty Republicans signaled
that they will vote against the CTBT); see also Isaacs, supra note 12 ("[G]etting from 60
probable votes to 67 sure votes is like forging a raging river at the finish line of a 10-mile
hike.").
20 See Kitfield, supra note 19 (quoting Isaacs: "At the end of the day, it's probably going to
come down to Obama or [Vice President] Biden sitting down with seven to 10 key
Republicans and saying, 'OK, what do you need in order to pass this treaty?' ").
2 See Joseph, supra note 18, at 80 ("With a healthy majority of Democratic senators in
place, and close relationships with key moderate Republicans, Obama is within reach of the
67 votes necessary to secure ratification .... ").
22 See Editorial, The Test Ban Treaty, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2009, at A18 (noting that during
the 2008 presidential campaign, McCain agreed another look at the Treaty was warranted and
that Lugar "said he would 'study [the Treaty] thoroughly' ").
23 See Joseph, supra note 18, at 84 ("Any serious campaign for a renewed bid for Senate
ratification must address such key issues as verifiability and whether the United States can
maintain a reliable and credible nuclear arsenal in the absence of future tests.").
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value and credibility of the American nuclear deterrent.24 Therefore, because
nuclear testing is unlawful in any event, opposition to CTBT ratification
premised on the legal freedom to resume nuclear testing should be
reconsidered.
Part II discusses several background issues regarding the CTBT and ICJ
opinions on the legality of nuclear testing outside the purview of the Treaty.
Part III investigates the current legal obligations of the United States
regarding a resumption of nuclear testing that favor an ICJ ruling that
underground tests are illegal as a matter of international law. Part IV
considers whether the United States could defeat the legal prohibition against
nuclear testing by "unsigning" the CTBT. Part V concludes with the
suggestion that because the United States faces similar legal obligations in
the absence of ratification as it would under a ratification regime, the
deterrence rationale for rejecting the CTBT should be reconsidered.
II. BACKGROUND
President George H. W. Bush signed a unilateral moratorium on nuclear
testing on October 2, 1992,25 and the United States has honored the
moratorium ever since.26 In this tradition, President Clinton signed the
CTBT shortly after it opened for signature on September 24, 1996, and
transmitted it to the United States Senate nearly one year later for advice and
consent on September 22, 1997.7
Most methods of nuclear testing were prohibited well before the adoption
of the moratorium and the drafting of the CTBT. The Limited Test Ban
Treaty of 1963 (LTBT) 2 ' ratified by the U.S. the same year, outlaws all
forms of nuclear testing with the exception of controlled underground
explosions within the territory of a party member. 29  A decade later, the
24 See Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict and Legality
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1995 I.C.J. 34, 63 (Nov. 15),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/5947.pdf ("[I]t is impossible to separate the
policy of deterrence from the legality of the use of the means of deterrence.").
25 Rupert Comwell, Bush Signs Nuclear Test Moratorium, INDEP. (Oct. 3, 1992), http://www.in
dpendent.co.uk/news/world/bush-signs-nuclear-test-moratorium-1 555090.html.
6 Philip Taubman, Op-Ed., Obama's Big Missile Test, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2009, at A31,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/09/opinion/09taubman.html.
27 Letter from William J. Clinton, U.S. President, to the Senate (Sept. 22, 1997), in
DISARMAMENT DIPL., Sept. 1997, available at http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/ddl8/18lett.htm.
28 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 (ratified by the United States Oct. 7,
1963; entered into force Oct. 10, 1963) [hereinafter LTBT].
29 See Christopher M. Petras, "Space Force Alpha" Military Use of the International Space
Station and the Concept of "Peaceful Purposes," 53 A.F. L. REv. 135, 148 & n.85 (2002)
(describing the LTBT's prohibition of nuclear testing as limited to the explosion of nuclear
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United States ratified the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, 30 a bilateral treaty
with the Soviet Union limiting the size of underground tests to 150
kilotons. 31 The CTBT aims to close this loophole and prohibits all methods
of testing.32 This restriction is consistent with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT), which in Article VI requires that nuclear states move toward
abolition of their nuclear arsenals.33
Should any party conduct a prohibited test after the CTBT enters into
force, Article V of the CTBT prescribes remedies for a violation of the
Treaty.34 Generally there are two remedies available to the party states.
First, the Conference of States Parties (Conference) 35 may elect to restrict or
suspend the violating party from the exercise of its rights and privileges
under the CTBT.36 Second, the Conference may recommend to party states
collective measures that conform to international law, including sanctions.37
38Article VI governs disputes over application of the Treaty. If a party
accused of violating the Treaty contests the interpretation or application of
the relevant terms, that accused Party can attempt first to settle its dispute
without judicial application.39 If, however, the parties ultimately cannot
agree on the application of the Treaty, the parties may, by mutual consent,
refer the matter to the ICJ.
40
The ICJ has handled disputes regarding nuclear testing in the past. In
1973, New Zealand filed suit at the court to determine the legality of French
nuclear testing. 4' France was conducting atmospheric nuclear tests in the
devices in the oceans, atmosphere, or outer space, and not covering underground tests carried
out within the territorial limits of the Treaty parties).
30 Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, U.S.-U.S.S.R., July 3,
1974, 1714 U.N.T.S. 216.
31 Patricia Hewitson, Nonproliferation and Reduction of Nuclear Weapons: Risks of
Weakening the Multilateral Nuclear Nonproliferation Norm, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 405,
448 n.233 (2003).
32 See id. at 448, 449 & n.2 3 3 (describing the goal of the CTBT as being a truly
comprehensive ban on testing to close any gaps left by the LTBT and other treaties).
33 See Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons art. VI, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T.
483, 729 U.N.T.S 161 [hereinafter NPT] (compelling parties to the Treaty to pursue
negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of nuclear development and toward
nuclear disarmament).
34 CTBT, supra note 2, art. V.
35 The Conference of State Parties is an organ established under the CTBT Organization.
Id art. II, para. 4.
36 Id. art. V, para. 2.
37 Id. para. 3.
38 Id. art. VI.
39 Id. para. 2.
40 Id.
41 Application of Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. Pleadings 2 (May 9); M. Keith
Siskin, Note, Does International Law Reflect International Opinion? French Nuclear Testing
in the Twentieth Century, 26 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 187, 191-94 (1996).
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South Pacific, and New Zealand specifically objected to this above ground
method of testing.42 The complaint claimed that the French tests constituted
a breach of legal norms against the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons
and that the tests would inflict significant environmental damage to New
Zealand's territories, causing interference with maritime and air navigation.
43
Before deciding the case on the merits, the court granted New Zealand's
request for an interim protective order that "the French Government should
avoid nuclear tests causing the deposit of radioactive fallout on [New
Zealand]."44
After the issuance of the protective order, but before the ICJ resolved the
substance of the case, France concluded its atmospheric testing and
announced that it would henceforth conduct only underground tests.45 The
ICJ utilized this development to sidestep the question of the legality of the
French tests, as "it found that there was no need to render judgment on New
Zealand's claim of potential injury from French nuclear testing because
France had shifted from atmospheric to underground testing. 46 Given the
specificity of the challenge to atmospheric testing in their complaint to the
court and the fact that underground testing was not illegal, the court
dismissed the complaint.47
In 1995, only one month after the members of the NPT agreed to extend
that treaty indefinitely, France announced its decision to resume nuclear
testing in the South Pacific.4 8 Shortly thereafter New Zealand initiated a new
round of proceedings at the ICJ. 49 New Zealand argued that the 1973 case
should be reopened to examine the legality of underground testing, based on
the same arguments from the prior case that French tests were resulting in
nuclear contamination of New Zealand's environment.5 ° As an intermediate
step, New Zealand argued that because of treaty obligations, customary
42 Barbara Kwiatkowska, New Zealand v. France Nuclear Tests: The Dismissed Case of
Lasting Significance, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 107, 111-12 (1996).
41 Id. at 112.
44 Don MacKay, Essay, Nuclear Testing: New Zealand and France in the International
Court of Justice, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1857, 1864 (1996).
45 Siskin, supra note 41, at 192.
46 Prudence Taylor, Testing Times for the World Court: Judicial Process and the 1995
French Nuclear Tests Case, 8 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 199, 201 (1997).
47 Id. at 201. But see MacKay, supra note 44, at 1865 (arguing that New Zealand's
complaint was not specific only to atmospheric testing and should not have been dismissed).
48 See MacKay, supra note 44, at 1857-58 (describing New Zealand as frustrated with
Chinese and French nuclear testing in the area, which it felt was inconsistent with the
obligations recently extended under the NPT).
49 Taylor, supra note 46, at 199.
50 Id. at 202; see generally MacKay, supra note 44, at 1870 (discussing that New Zealand
tried to reopen the earlier case, rather than filing a new case, because after the initiation of the
1973 case France, withdrew from the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ).
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international law, and the "precautionary principle" of international
environmental law, France should be required to perform an environmental
impact assessment prior to conducting underground tests.5 '
As it had done in 1973, the ICJ resolved the case without reaching the
merits by holding that the original complaint was limited to atmospheric
testing, which France had not resumed.52 The court refused to reopen the
case or consider the legality of nuclear testing.5 3
Although the ICJ seemed reluctant in these cases to address the merits of
legal questions regarding nuclear weapons, the court demonstrated a
willingness to comment on this topic in later cases. For example, in 1996,
only one year after dismissing New Zealand's challenge to reopen the 1973
case, the ICJ responded to requests by the World Health Organization
(WHO) and the U.N. General Assembly for advisory opinions on the legality
of the threat and use of nuclear weapons. 54 New Zealand again appeared
before the court, this time on behalf of the U.N. General Assembly, levying
similar arguments against continued French nuclear tests as it had in the prior
cases.5 5 Despite dismissing the WHO's advisory request,5 6 the court spoke
directly to the substance of the legal issues in the U.N. General Assembly's
petition, finding that "the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally
be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and
in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law."15 7
The court's advisory opinion on nuclear issues is significant for several
reasons. First, it established that the ICJ is not so concerned with political
repercussions that it will never reach the merits on a legal question regarding
nuclear issues.58 Second, the court displayed an opinion that state conduct
regarding nuclear weapons can be constrained by customary international
51 Taylor, supra note 46, at 202-03.
52 Id. at 204.
13 Id. at 205.
54 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226
(July 8); Michael J. Matheson, The Opinions of the International Court of Justice on the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 417, 417 (1997).
55 MacKay, supra note 44, at 1885.
56 Matheson, supra note 54, at 419 ("[The] WHO may legitimately address the effects on
public health of the use of nuclear weapons and possible means of dealing with these effects,
but has no competence to address the legality or illegality of the use of this or any other type
of weapons.").
57 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 54, at 266; see also
Matheson, supra note 54, at 418 (quoting the International Court of Justice).
58 See Matheson, supra note 54, at 421 (explaining that the ICJ will decline a request for an
advisory opinion from the U.N. General Assembly only for "compelling reasons," which, in
the context of the legality of nuclear weapons, did not include the political character of the
request).
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law.59 Third, it showed that the U.N. General Assembly has the power to
request advisory opinions from the ICJ and demonstrated a readiness to do so
on nuclear issues.6°
III. NUCLEAR TESTING BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
In the event that another state challenges the legality of American nuclear
testing,61 the ICJ is the most likely forum to adjudicate the dispute.62 The
ICJ's general jurisdiction gives the court the competence to hear disputes
regarding the issue of nuclear testing.63 Although the court can refuse
jurisdiction at its discretion if it determines that there are "compelling
reasons" for doing so, such a course is unlikely given that the court rejected
this rationale regarding nuclear weapons issues in its 1996 Advisory
Opinion.64 In particular, the Court did not dismiss the advisory request on
the grounds that it represented a political question.65
Jurisdictional issues regarding parties, however, are somewhat more
complicated. Although the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ
Statute) contains a mechanism for compulsory jurisdiction,66 this provision is
inapplicable 67 to countries, such as the United States, that do not consent to
59 See Larry D. Johnson, Protecting the World from Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Reflections on the High-Level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change, 38 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 63, 67 (2007) (suggesting that it is of particular interest that the ICJ was asked to
give advice on whether customary international law would be violated by use of nuclear
weapons).
60 See Matheson, supra note 54, at 420 (noting that the United States, among others, did not
contest the authority of the U.N. General Assembly to request an advisory opinion from the
ICJ).
61 For the purposes of this Note, "nuclear testing" refers only to the detonation of warheads,
and does not include nuclear testing through computer simulation.
62 See Laurence Boisson de Chazoumes & Philippe Sands, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL
LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 1, 18-19 (Laurence
Boisson de Chazournes & Philippe Sands eds., 1999) (contending that the 1996 nuclear
advisory opinion reflects increased respect for the ICJ generally and signals that the court is
"likely to figure ever more prominently in the resolution of political and legal disputes").
63 See RENATA SZAFARZ, THE COMPULSORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE, at ix (1993) ("The ICJ ... is the only contemporary world court with general
powers.").
64 VED P. NANDA & DAVID KRIEGER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE WORLD COURT 108
(1998); see also Matheson, supra note 54, at 418 ("The Court also decided [that it would
issue] an advisory opinion, finding that the General Assembly had raised a legal question that
was within its competence to ask.").
65 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 54, at 234.
66 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36(2), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S.
No. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
67 See id. art. 36(3) (allowing a party state to declare at any time its acceptance of the
compulsory jurisdiction of the court subject to condition or termination at the discretion of the
party state).
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be bound by it.68 It is likely, however, that the United States would submit
voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the court.69 Although France contested the
jurisdiction of the court in its case with New Zealand by withdrawing
consent for compulsory jurisdiction in 1973,70 the United States attended the
advisory opinion proceedings and debated the issues on the merits. 71 With
international respect for the ICJ strong and increasing,72 political costs will
probably compel the United States to notify the court that it has no objection
to jurisdiction on the subject matter of nuclear testing.73
If a case is not brought before the court, the ICJ may issue an advisory
opinion regarding nuclear testing. The court's jurisdiction regarding this
mechanism is limited, however, since advisory opinions may be issued only
upon the request of a body authorized by the United Nations Charter.74 The
only organizations vested with such power are the General Assembly, the
Security Council, "[o]ther organs of the United Nations and specialized
agencies" authorized by the General Assembly. 75  Although the 1996
Advisory Opinion on nuclear weapons signals some willingness on the part
of the court to construe its advisory jurisdiction more broadly than in the
76past, it remains a narrow option.
Should the ICJ address the issue of American testing, its decision would
likely focus on one of two issues. First, a neighboring state that fears it will
be caught in the path of radioactive fallout could charge the United States
68 See Tim Taylor, War: The Mother of All Mass Torts?, 6 SEDONA CONF. J. 161, 165
(2005) (noting that in 1984 the United States withdrew from the compulsory jurisdiction of
the court, limiting this jurisdictional option in future cases regarding customary international
law).
69 See CONSTANZE SCHULTE, COMPLIANCE WITH DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE 404 (2004) (noting that since 1984, no country, including the United States, has
contested the jurisdiction of the ICJ in any case, and arguing that although possible, it is
unlikely any country would do so in the future).
70 See Andrew T. Guzman & Jennifer Landsidle, The Myth of International Delegation, 96
CALIF. L. REV. 1693, 1715 (2008) (noting that in the 1973 case, France immediately refused to
participate, withdrawing consent for compulsory jurisdiction).
71 See Charles J. Moxley, Jr., The Unlawfulness of the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear
Weapons, 8 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 447, 450-51 (2002) (noting the positions argued by the
United States on the merits before the ICJ during the proceedings regarding the legality of the
use or threat of use of nuclear weapons).
72 SCHULTE, supra note 69, at 404.
73 See SZAFARZ, supra note 63, at 6 (suggesting that, in compliance with the Article 36(1)
jurisdictional mechanism of the ICJ Statute, a state can express consent to jurisdiction via
special agreement on the issue of the case).
74 ICJ Statute, supra note 66, art. 65(1).
75 U.N. Charter art. 96.
76 Gavan Griffith & Christopher Staker, The Jurisdiction and Merits Phases Distinguished,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS
supra note 62, at 59, 75.
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with violating international environmental laws.77 This type of argument
would be similar to that pursued by New Zealand in its cases against
France. 78  The environmental argument would likely be somewhat less
persuasive in the case of American testing than it was against France,
however, as a new round of tests would likely take place underground and
within the continental United States, limiting fallout.79  Second, nuclear
testing could be challenged in light of relevant customary international law
and obligations undertaken by the United States as a member of the NPT.
These non-environmental rationales are explored in greater detail in the
remainder of Part III.
A. Customary International Law
The ICJ should hold that the United States is bound by customary
international law to refrain from testing nuclear weapons. As a preliminary
matter, it is important to note that customary international law provides
sufficient authority for the ICJ to issue such a holding. Article 38(l)(b) of
the ICJ Statute grants the court the power to rule on "international custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law. ' ,80  The court can cite
obligations it deems have arisen from diplomatic relations between states,
practices of international organizations, and individual state law and
practice.8s
Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna
Convention) requires a state to "refrain from acts which would defeat the
object and purpose of a treaty when [that state] has signed the treaty or has
exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification,
acceptance or approval. .. Although the United States has signed the
Vienna Convention, the U.S. is not bound as a treaty member because it has
not ratified the document. 3
77 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 54, at 241 (noting that
a number of states argued before the ICJ that nuclear detonations violated various existing
environmental treaties).
78 See supra text accompanying notes 41-44.
79 See Steve Tetreault, Senate Confirms Energy Secretary, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Feb. 1,
2005, at 3B (noting that President George W. Bush prepared the Nevada Test Site in the event
that further nuclear testing is required).
80 ICJ Statute, supra note 66, art. 38.
81 Stephan Wilske & Teresa Schiller, Jurisdiction over Persons Abducted in Violation of
International Law in the Aftermath of United States v Alvarez-Machain, 5 U. Cim. L. ScH.
ROUNDTABLE 205, 212-13 (1998).
82 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].
83 Hewitson, supra note 3 1, at 462.
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Ratification notwithstanding, the ICJ should conclude that the tenets of
Vienna Convention Article 18 have legal force because they reflect
customary international law. Although some commentators dispute the
issue, "the better view appears to be that [A]rticle 18 codified international
law as it existed at the time the Vienna Convention was adopted. 84 The
International Law Commission took this view when it drafted the Article,85
and historical evidence suggests that international tribunals recognized a
similar obligation for a signatory "to refrain from acts that would frustrate a
treaty's purpose long before the Vienna Convention was adopted.
8 6
Significantly, the United States officially acknowledges that the Vienna
Convention reflects customary international law generally 87 and has made
representations as such specifically regarding Article 18.88
On the basis of Article 18, the ICJ should construe President Clinton's
signature of the CTBT in 1996 as requiring that the United States generally
avoid taking steps that would actively undermine the Treaty. Although
discerning the precise object and purpose of the CTBT is a difficult task,89
there is little doubt that it includes a ban on the testing of nuclear weapons. 9°
In the Treaty's preamble, the document speaks to its purpose.91 For example,
the parties recognize "that cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions
and all other nuclear explosions" as primary goals.92 In particular, a nuclear
test designed to maintain and upgrade deterrent capabilities, especially if
intended to produce new weapons, is expressly denounced in the text.
93
84 MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 171 (1990).
85 Id. at 171-72.
86 Id. at 172.
87 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.state.
gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2011) ("The United States considers many
of the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to constitute customary
international law on the law of treaties.").
88 See Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2061, 2079 n.82 (2003) (noting
representations made by Secretary of State William P. Rogers in 1971 and Ambassador Elliot
Richardson in 1979, as well as statements made by Secretary of State John Hay).
89 See David S. Jonas, The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Current Legal Status
in the United States and the Implications of a Nuclear Test Explosion, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 1007, 1035 (2007) (cautioning that articulation of any treaty's object and purpose is "a
formidable task" and noting that an evaluation of the CTBT includes secondary steps such as
investigating the goals of the NPT).
90 See Hewitson, supra note 31, at 464 (arguing that any test resulting in a nuclear
explosion would defeat the object and purpose of the CTBT).
See CTBT, supra note 2, pmbl. (stating a number of arms control objectives, such as
general nonproliferation, tangible steps toward disarmament, and cessation of all nuclear
testing).
92 Id.
93 See id. ("[The party states aim to constrain] the development and qualitative
improvement of nuclear weapons and [to end] the development of advanced new types of
nuclear weapons.").
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Whether other state behavior, such as failing to fund the Preparatory
Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization,
94
would violate the object and purpose of the CTBT is beyond the scope of this
Note.
Although Article 18 prohibits a state from undermining a treaty that it has
signed, Article 18 binds that state only "until it shall have made its intention
clear not to become a party to the treaty."9' Proponents of testing will likely
argue that the Bush administration rejected CTBT party membership 96 by
refusing to resubmit the Treaty to the Senate for ratification and by
considering the resumption of nuclear testing.97 Moreover, the United States
may have manifested precisely the requisite intent by rejecting the CTBT
when it came before the Senate in 1999.
The ICJ, however, should reject any contention that the United States
does not intend to become a party to the CTBT. Although no definite
standard exists regarding what constitutes an expression of the requisite
intent,98 the court should make clear that more is required than contravening
the principles of the Treaty in question. To hold otherwise produces an
absurd result, whereby a state could dodge the obligation against frustrating
the object and purpose of a treaty by intentionally violating that very same
duty. If this were the case, Article 18 would be rendered meaningless,
devoid of any substantive weight. 99 As a result, the Bush administration's
pro-testing policies cannot have defeated the Article 18 commitment to the
CTBT.
The Senate's rejection of the CTBT should also be dismissed as
inadequate evidence that the United States does not intend to become a party
to the Treaty. While a Senate vote rejecting the Treaty may appear to resolve
this issue against a continuing obligation, a closer look reveals that this is far
94 The Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is an interim
organization tasked with building up the verification regime of the CTBT in preparation for the
Treaty's entry into force as well as promoting the Treaty's universality. Establishment, Purpose
and Activities, CTBTO PREPARATORY COMMISSION, http://www.ctbto.org/the-organization/ctbto-
preparatory-commission/establishmentpurpose-and-activities/page- 1-establishment-purpose-acti
vities/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2011).
95 Vienna Convention, supra note 82, art. 18(a).
96 See Hewitson, supra note 3 1, at 462 (noting little indication that the Bush administration
felt bound by the United States' signature of the CTBT).
97 Ronald E. Powaski, Bush's Nuclear Hypocrisy, 2004 BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS 24.
98 See Swaine, supra note 88, at 2082 (noting that there is no guidance on how the intention
not to become a party may be made manifest).
99 See generally Frank B. Cross, Essay, The Significance of Statutory Interpretative
Methodologies, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1971, 1973 (2007) (discussing how the rule against
surplusage-the judicial canon of interpretation that all terms in a statute have independent
meaning and should not be construed so as to render any such term or phrase superfluous-
would counsel against such a result).
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from the case. After the 1999 Senate vote, the CTBT became the legal
property of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 00 If the Senate wished
to signal a definite end to obligations under Article 18, it would have simply
returned the Treaty to the President via a resolution,' 0 ' but the Senate did not
do so. By not returning the Treaty, the Senate indicated that it could still act
upon the Treaty. 10 2 "In the meantime, a treaty in the posture of the CTBT
has no legal effect, other than to impose the obligations ... with respect to
customary international law as codified in [Vienna Convention] [A]rticle
18. ,,13 Moreover, executive commitment remains a strong signal in favor of
becoming party to the CTBT, as President Clinton made clear that despite the
Senate's rejection, the United States will continue to work toward CTBT
ratification'1 4 and President Obama renewed this pledge.'05 Ultimately, the
ICJ should have little difficulty finding that executive lobbying on behalf of
the Treaty while the Senate holds the document creates an obligation for the
United States to refrain from undermining its object and purpose pending
efforts toward ratification.
B. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
The ICJ should also hold that testing of nuclear weapons violates Article
VI of the NPT. This provision requires parties to the NPT "to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the
nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a
treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control.' 0 6 The court, quoting this language, should find that
nuclear testing contravenes two independent commitments established
therein: pursuit of good faith measures toward disarmament and curbing the
nuclear arms race.
The disarmament obligation should be interpreted to preclude nuclear
testing because nuclear testing is simply incompatible with a general treaty
on disarmament. Nuclear tests are conducted for purposes that would violate
any such treaty, such as a non-nuclear state seeking the technological
wherewithal to produce rudimentary weapons and a nuclear state looking to
upgrade existing stockpiles and develop advanced weapons designs. 0 7
100 Jonas, supra note 89, at 1045.
101 GLENNON, supra note 84, at 173-74.
102 Jonas, supra note 89, at 1046.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 1029.
105 Joseph, supra note 18, at 89.
106 NPT, supra note 33, art. VI.
107 See John D. Holum, The CTBT and Nuclear Disarmament-The U.S. View, 51 J. INT'L
AFF. 263, 272-73 (1997) (arguing that the CTBT facilitates disarmament by banning
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Obligations undertaken by NPT party states at member conferences confirm
this premise.I°8 At the 1995 Review Conference, for example, the NPT party
states committed in principle to the entry into force of the CTBT.109 This
was done in part to broker a compromise whereby the nuclear weapons states
were not immediately required to commit to a treaty that abolishes nuclear
weapons as described by Article VI, and, in return, the NPT was permanently
extended. "0 Similarly, party states agreed at the 2000 Review Conference to
a number of practical steps to implement the disarmament mandate of Article
VI, including renewing the pledge to achieve urgent entry into force of the
CTBT.111 These conferences suggest that the NPT party states themselves
interpret Article VI as outlawing nuclear testing.
The ICJ should also rule that nuclear tests violate the clause in Article VI
that requires that states pursue effective measures aimed at cessation of the
nuclear arms race.' 12 Nuclear testing is antithetical to non-proliferation with
tests deeply linked to weapons production.113 Notably, the drafters of the
CTBT intended a test ban to prevent exactly such arms racing.114 Ultimately,
it is hardly a stretch in logic for the court to rule that testing nuclear weapons
is more consistent with arms racing than any cessation thereof. Although
Article X of the NPT grants each party "the right to withdraw from the
Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events.., have jeopardized the
explosive testing by nuclear states that would otherwise be used to create new weapons
designs, such as micro-nuclear weapons, and contending that a ban on nuclear weapons will
serve as an effective constraint on non-nuclear states from crossing the nuclear threshold).
108 Jonas, supra note 89, at 1035.
109 Jack Mendelsohn, History and Evaluation of the Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Cold
War, 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 609, 612 (1999).
l0 See Letter of Submittal from Madeleine Albright, Sec'y of State of the U.S., to William
J. Clinton, President of the U.S. (Sept. 20, 1997), available at http://fip.resource.org/gpo.gov/
documents/ 1 05/td02 8.105.txt ("[I]t became clear that a comprehensive test-ban could make a
major contribution to achievement of the NPT's permanent extension ... .
Ved P. Nanda, Nuclear Weapons, Human Security, and International Law, 37 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 331, 339-40 (2009).
112 Arsalan M. Suleman, Bargaining in the Shadow of Violence: The NPT, JAEA, and
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Negotiations, 26 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 206, 223 (2008).
113 See Key Reasons for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, CENTER FOR ARMS CONTROL &
NON-PROLIFERATION, http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nuclearweapons/articles/reasons
ctbt/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2011) (arguing that testing is crucial for "threshold" states to develop
a modem nuclear arsenal and for nuclear states to develop new weapons designs); see also Sarah
Elizabeth Kreps & Anthony Clark Arend, Why States Follow the Rules: Toward a Positional
Theory of Adherence to International Legal Regimes, 16 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 331, 355
(2006) ("Since testing a nuclear device is a key component of nuclear development, fulfillment
of the CTBT provisions is almost a de facto prerequisite for NPT ratification by non-nuclear
states.").
114 Daryl G. Kimball, Why We Don't Need to Resume Nuclear Testing, 39 ARMS CONTROL
TODAY 3, Nov. 2009, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009 11/focus.
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supreme interests of its country,"'1 5 the United States has not taken such a
step, and the permanent extension of the NPT provides a legal duty for the
ICJ to cite in the meantime.'
16
Moreover, the ICJ should find that language within the preamble of the
NPT clarifies that abstention from testing is a requirement of both the
disarmament and arms racing obligations of Article VI. The NPT preamble
introduces the document by listing a number of proclamations." 7  In
particular the parties to the NPT declare "their intention to achieve at the
earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake
effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament" and urge "the
cooperation of all States in the attainment of this objective."' 8 Although this
language does not include the reference to a treaty on general and complete
disarmament, it is otherwise strikingly similar to the text of NPT Article
VI."19 Immediately following these proclamations, the preamble addresses
nuclear testing. The text recalls the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty and
expresses a determination to "achieve the discontinuance of all test
explosions of nuclear weapons for all time ....
The NPT's preamble language regarding testing should be interpreted as a
subset of the broader disarmament and arms racing obligations. The
structure of the text is consistent with this reading. Once the preamble
recites the Article VI commitments and urges all states to comply therewith,
only three statements remain. The first statement, addressed above, calls for
the end of all nuclear testing. The second and third statements advocate
liquidation of existing nuclear arsenals and abstention from threats of force
that challenge a nation's territorial integrity.'12  Read together, these
provisions respectively outlaw the production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear
weapons and thusly a blueprint for attaining compliance with Article VI.
Although testing proponents may argue that the proclamations in the NPT
preamble are each distinct statements, this contention should be rejected.
First, an examination of the text reveals that the clauses are separated by
115 NPT, supra note 33, art. X.
116 See Albright, supra note 110 (noting that the United States lobbied vigorously for "the
indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT").
"'7 NPT, supra note 33, pmbl.
118 id.
119 The phrases "nuclear disarmament" and "cessation of the nuclear arms race" appear as
key phrases in both the preamble and Article VI. Id. pmbl., art. VI. Interpretation of similar
language in a statute or treaty is guided by the judicial cannon in pari materia, which suggests
that the terms should be treated consistently. Particularly where the terms are identical, as is
the case here, a court should interpret the terms to have the same meaning. See Jamie Darin
Prenkert, Bizarro Statutory Stare Decisis, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 217, 234 & n.1 10
(2007) (discussing the in pari materia canon).
120 NPT, supra note 33, pmbl.
121 Id.
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commas rather than by periods, suggesting that the language taken together
forms one complete paragraph, or at least one expression of intent. Second,
specific wording within the preamble requires that the proclamations be read
in reference to one another. For example, one paragraph urges the
cooperation of all nations with "this objective, 122 which, when read in a
vacuum, is rendered meaningless, without reference to the prior paragraph.
Significantly, the ICJ has relevant precedent on which it can rely when
rendering a ruling that nuclear testing violates Article VI of the NPT. The
1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion provides the grounds for the ICJ
to more explicitly rule that NPT party states must complete concrete steps
toward nuclear disarmament. 123 In the 1996 Advisory Opinion, the court
interpreted Article VI as requiring not only more than mere negotiations
toward disarmament, but mandated the conclusion of these efforts.
124
Prompted by this language, the U.N. General Assembly issued a resolution
calling for multilateral negotiations to prohibit, among other things, testing
nuclear weapons. 25 The resolution has two important effects. First, the
resolution demonstrates that the advisory opinion broadened the scope of
Article VI, such that the ICJ can rely upon it as a code of conduct until the
Treaty on general and complete disarmament envisioned by the NPT is
completed. 126 Second, the resolution serves as independent authority for the
ICJ to rule that the United States is bound not to test nuclear weapons.127
Despite these arguments, the ICJ's 1996 Advisory Opinion left room for
the legitimate use of nuclear weapons. The court held that it could not
definitively conclude that use of nuclear weapons would be unlawful in "an
extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State
would be at stake.' 28  It is not at all clear, however, that the testing of
122 id.
123 Miguel Marin Bosch, The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Its Future, in INTERNATIONAL
LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS, supra note 62, at 375,
375.
124 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 54, at 267 ("There
exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to
nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control."
(emphasis added)); see also NANDA & KRIEGER, supra note 64, at 164 (noting that although
there is a considerable dispute on the precedential weight accorded to other components of the
advisory opinion, nearly all states recognize the conclusiveness on the rulings regarding
disarmament negotiations).
125 Bosch, supra note 123, at 387.
126 id.
127 Roger S. Clark, Treaty and Custom, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS, supra note 62, at 171, 176 (noting that although the U.N.
Charter does not grant legislative power to the General Assembly, the ICJ accepts that
resolutions of the General Assembly are sufficient evidence of state practice such that the
subject matter constitutes customary international law).
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 54, at 266.
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nuclear weapons falls into this narrow exception. Nuclear testing is more
readily characterized as a production measure and a means of deterrence than
an immediate defensive use for state survival. Ultimately, proponents of
nuclear testing would likely find it difficult to convince the court of this
exception, as the advisory opinion was a rebuke of the legality of nuclear
deterrence generally. 129  Moreover, the ICJ should generally err against
finding particular nuclear tests legitimate, since the court noted that treaties,
such as the LTBT, "point to an increasing concern in the international
community with [nuclear] weapons," which calls into question the
legitimacy of certain uses of the weapons. 30
IV. UNSIGNING
To legally resume nuclear testing, some scholars propose "unsigning" the
CTBT.131  In practice, there is no procedural mechanism to remove a
signature from a treaty. 3 2 An option for the United States is to announce
that it no longer intends to pursue ratification of the CTBT and that it
formally considers its prior signature of the Treaty as carrying no legal
weight. The suggestion to unsign the CTBT echoes a similar course the
United States took regarding the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (ICC). 3 3 On December 31, 2000, President Clinton authorized a U.S.
representative to sign the Rome Statute, establishing the ICC. 13' Although
such a move was unprecedented,'3 5 the Bush administration announced on
May 6, 2002 that the United States no longer intended to be bound by
President Clinton's signature, effectively unsigning the ICC.136 The United
129 NANDA & KRIEGER, supra note 64, at 164-65.
130 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 54, at 253.
131 Kathleen C. Bailey & Robert B. Barker, Why the United States Should Unsign the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Resume Nuclear Testing, 22 COMP. STRATEGY 131, 137
(2003); see also Swaine, supra note 88, at 2089 (suggesting that, although there are some
policy concerns regarding acts of unsigning, it should be accepted as a "legitimate and
understandable course of action").
132 Dominic McGoldrick, Political and Legal Responses to the ICC, in THE PERMANENT
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 389, 414 (Dominic McGoldrick et al. eds., 2004).
133 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90; see
also Curtis A. Bradley, The Bush Administration and International Law: Too Much
Lawyering and Too Little Diplomacy, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 57, 61 (2009)
(describing the Bush administration's unsigning of the ICC, noting that instead of attempting
to remove the signature from the document, the administration simply announced its intention
not to become party to the Treaty).
134 Brett D. Schaefer, Overturning Clinton's Midnight Action on the International Criminal
Court, HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 9, 2001), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2001/01/ov
erturning-clintons-midnight-action-on-the-icc.135 Swaine, supra note 88, at 2064.
136 McGoldrick, supra note 132, at 414.
[Vol. 39:341
LOSERS ALWAYS WHINE ABOUT THEIR TEST
States' "' unsigning' signified and symbolized the US's rejection of the
icc.'
13 7
International law generally does not pose a barrier to unsigning treaties.
Although some commentators argue that Article 18 of the Vienna
Convention makes unsigning a treaty impossible, 38 this argument is
ultimately untenable. Article 18 only requires that a party refrain from
undermining the object and purpose of a treaty "until it shall have made its
intention clear not to become a party to the Treaty."' 3 9
The language in Article 18 creates only an interim obligation for the
signing state during the period between signature and either ratification or
repudiation.140 The interim obligation should not be construed to preclude
unsigning, since this would create an illogical result, similar to that discussed
in Part III regarding whether resuming nuclear testing could defeat the
moratorium obligation.' 4' While it is absurd to allow a state to free itself of
its legal obligations by flagrantly violating them, those same obligations
cannot be imposed where a state lawfully declines to be bound by them. To
prevent significant language in Article 18 from being rendered meaningless,
states must be free to declare their intent not to become a party to a signed
but ungratified treaty. 142  The act of unsigning, in particular, provides a
lawful means of expressing such intent. 1
43
A. Does Unsigning Eliminate the Obligation Not to Test?
If President Obama or a successor were to unsign the CTBT, the legal
duties of the United States regarding nuclear testing would certainly be
implicated. The interim obligation not to undermine the object and purpose
of the Treaty would no longer apply because President Clinton's signature
117 Id. at 414.
138 See Michael J. Kelly, Op-Ed., Imperfect Justice, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb. 7, 2001,
at B-7 (contending that unsigning "undermine[s] the object and purpose of [a] treaty," and
thus is impossible).
139 Vienna Convention, supra note 82, art. 18(a).
140 Jonas, supra note 89, at 1031.
141 See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
142 See Curtis A. Bradley, Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S. Constitution,
48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 307, 334 (2007) ("As a matter of international law, there seems to be little
question that a nation is entitled to declare its intention not to become a party to a treaty after
siPgn ing it.").
See Swaine, supra note 88, at 2082 (arguing that unsigning should constitute an
expression of the intent not to become party to a treaty required by the interim obligation
imposed by Article 18 of the Vienna Convention); see also Jonas, supra note 89, at 1043
(arguing that unsigning is consistent with Article 18).
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would no longer be of legal significance. 44 Thus, if a case were presented to
the ICJ regarding the legality of American nuclear testing, the court could
not cite the customary international law grounds regarding the object and
purpose of signed treaties to conclude that American nuclear testing is
illegal.
Regardless of the effect that unsigning the CTBT would have on the
obligation of the United States regarding Article 18 of the Vienna
Convention, the ICJ should find that American commitments not to conduct
nuclear tests embodied in Article VI of the NPT would remain unchanged.
Put simply, the disarmament and arms race obligations expressed in Article
VI are legal barriers to testing independent of the CTBT. To evade this legal
obstacle, the United States may have to withdraw from the NPT altogether.
Although, as a general tool, unsigning does not violate international law,
the act of unsigning the CTBT may run contrary to the good faith negotiation
requirements of Article VI of the NPT. This provision mandates that every
state party to the NPT "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures" regarding the disarmament and arms race provisions discussed
above.'45 The ICJ has ruled that such a good faith requirement obligates
parties to strive for meaningful negotiations and requires that the parties be
willing to compromise on arms control. 46 Assuming that the disarmament
and arms race commitments include abstention from nuclear testing as some
suggest, 147 the ICJ should find that the act of unsigning the CTBT is a hostile
rejection of compromise regarding effective measures toward disarmament
which undermines meaningful negotiation toward a broader treaty aimed at
abolition of nuclear weapons.
B. The Domestic Mechanics of Unsigning
Even if unsigning the CTBT could eliminate any and all American
obligation not to test its nuclear weapons, domestic legal matters may make
this route infeasible for testing proponents. As an initial matter, the U.S.
Constitution provides the power to make a treaty to the President, once the
144 See Swaine, supra note 88, at 2082-83 (suggesting that if the United States wished to
take actions inconsistent with the object and purpose of a signed treaty, unsigning would be an
effective way to quickly disengage itself from its Article 18 obligations).
145 NPT, supra note 33, art. VI; see supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
146 See N. Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G./Den., F.R.G./Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 3, 85 (Feb. 20)
(discussing a good faith negotiation requirement in the context of the North Sea continental
shelf similar to Article VI of the NPT).
147 See Jonas, supra note 89, at 1035-36 ("Because a comprehensive test ban has been
identified historically (and implicitly in the NPT) as a key element leading to eventual nuclear
disarmament, this could arguably be an object and purpose of the CTBT as well.").
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Senate approves it. 148 Once the President submits a treaty for "the Advice
and Consent of the Senate,"'149 however, the document becomes "the legal
property of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee," making it impossible
for the President to unsign it until it is returned. 50 Although the President
could request that the Senate pass a resolution to return the Treaty, no
President has done so with the CTBT.15' Proponents of unsigning could
argue that because the President must ratify the Treaty after it has received
the consent of the Senate, the President should possess the power to unsign
the CTBT even if it is in the possession of another branch. Yet because the
Treaty is not technically within the President's control, "custom apparently
supports a requirement that the President seek Senate consent for the
withdrawal of a disfavored treaty."' 52
Although this may appear to be a purely technical or theoretical issue, the
interbranch legal hurdle arose in practice. In early 2001, the Bush
administration contemplated unsigning the CTBT, but ultimately concluded
that it could not do so while the document remained in the possession of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 153 The administration did not face a
similar problem with the Rome Statute to the ICC because that document
was never sent to the Senate for its advice and consent.
54
This interbranch legal hurdle is compounded by domestic politics.
Initially, as noted in Part I, President Obama has provided strong support for
the test ban, pledging to lean on Congress until it ratifies the Treaty. Given
this commitment, it seems highly unlikely that the President could be
convinced to request that the Senate return the CTBT to him so that he could
unsign it. Second, even if another President were committed to unsigning
the Treaty, the Senate may be unwilling to return it to the President,
155
especially as Senate Democrats are expected to oppose such a move.
156
148 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
149 Id.
150 Thom Shanker & David E. Sanger, White House Wants to Bury Pact Banning Tests of
Nuclear Arms, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2001, at Al.
151 See Jonas, supra note 89, at 1045-46 ("[Tlhe CTBT is languishing in the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee....").
152 GLENNON, supra note 84, at 175.
153 See Shanker & Sanger, supra note 150 (noting that "[o]nce a treaty is sent to the Senate,
there is little a president or a successor can do to dispose of it").
154 Eric P. Schwartz, The United States and the International Criminal Court: The Case for
"Dexterous Multilateralism," 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 223, 229 (2003).
155 See Shanker & Sanger, supra note 150 (noting that two-thirds of the Senate must agree to
any resolution to send a treaty back to the president).
6 See Joseph, supra note 18, at 85 (predicting the continued support of Senate Democrats
for the CTBT because they believe in its merits).
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C Policy Problems with the Act of Unsigning
Even if nuclear testing proponents in the Senate were able to muster the
votes for a resolution to return the CTBT to President Obama or a successor,
strong policy considerations may convince the President to forego unsigning
the document. First, unsigning the CTBT is likely to undermine general
treaty-making and encourage other states to ignore constraints imposed by
international law.'57 A second treaty unsigning may generate significant
doubt in regards to American commitments to multilateralism 5 8 and create
resentment that could make future treaty negotiations more difficult or even
impossible. 5 9 International resentment has particular relevance to the
nuclear testing context, as the reputational injuries that the United States
would likely suffer from unsigning the CTBT may undermine arms control
negotiations and anti-terrorism cooperation, 160 ultimately impairing the
security and stability that deterrence advocates hope to generate from
modernized weapons. More generally, an unraveling of the basic treaty-
making process will damage the international cooperative order that
American military power relies on for effectiveness, thereby limiting the
utility of deterrence.
161
A second policy concern that undercuts the utility of unsigning is the
reaction that such a move would provoke from American allies. Generally,
the Bush administration's attitude and approach toward treaties provoked
strong criticism from European partners.162  If President Obama or a
successor were to unsign the CTBT-itself a significant symbol of
international arms contro1163 -it could significantly harm recent progress
157 See Swaine, supra note 88, at 2064-65 (arguing that unsigning sets a precedent that may
lay the groundwork for undermining a whole range of treaties).
5 See Antonia Chayes, How American Treaty Behavior Threatens National Security, 33
INT'L SECURITY 45, 75 (2008) (questioning whether the United States can undermine
significant international treaties without signaling to other countries that it stands above
international cooperation).
159 See id. at 51 (arguing that further withdrawal from treaties may hamper the United States
as it negotiates and seeks support for new agreements).
160 See id. at 74-76 (suggesting that America's reputation internationally may have declined
significantly in the wake of the unsigning of the ICC and arguing that damage to the U.S.
image undermines cooperation over such issues as nuclear and biological weapons
proliferation).
161 See id at 46 (contending that although the United States is the world's sole superpower,
military strength is ineffective without international cooperation gleaned from treaty-making).
162 See Strobe Talbott, From Prague to Baghdad: NATO at Risk, 81 FOREIGN AFF. 46, 47
(2002) (noting that although disputes between the United States and Europe are typical, the
rancor over the Bush administration's handling of treaties was unusually intense).
163 See Joseph, supra note 18, at 82 (arguing that the CTBT, more than any other single
measure, symbolizes the commitment of the United States to the NPT and demonstrates
respect for the concerns of nonnuclear weapon states).
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made by the Obama administration in restoring America's image 6 4 by
signaling that unsigning is an active tool of United States diplomacy, rather
than a relic of the Bush administration.165 Alienating allies in this manner
would undermine one of the central purposes of renewed testing, which is to
build stronger military relations with security partners.
V. CONCLUSION
By pressing for its ratification, President Obama brought new life to the
debate regarding the CTBT. As was the case in the late 1990s, Republican
opposition led by Senator Kyl has focused on concerns over deterrence and a
need for a new round of nuclear testing. One question, which is often
overlooked in this debate, however, is whether the United States already has
a legal obligation not to test its nuclear weapons. If this is the case, the legal
impediments to breaking the moratorium on nuclear testing would not
substantially change under a ratified CTBT, and the deterrence rationale to
reject the Treaty should be reexamined.
If the United States announces plans to resume nuclear testing and a
challenge to these tests is presented before the ICJ, the court should hold that
the United States is in violation of international law. First, President
Clinton's signature of the CTBT creates an obligation such that the United
States cannot undermine the object and purpose of the document. Nuclear
testing would clearly violate this principle. Second, tests would violate
America's commitments under the NPT, regarding both disarmament and
halting the nuclear arms race. The ICJ should cite its advisory opinion on
nuclear use to support this holding.
If the Obama administration or a successor administration considers
unsigning the CTBT to defeat the legal obligation not to test nuclear
weapons, this course will likely be rejected. Initially, unsigning the CTBT
will not defeat an obligation to abstain from testing nuclear weapons existing
in Article VI of the NPT. Moreover, although international law generally
poses no significant barrier to unsigning treaties, the good faith negotiation
164 See Joseph Nye, Obama's "Timidity" Is a Foreign Policy Virtue, HUFF1NGTON POST
(Nov. 3, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joseph-nye/obamas-timidity-is-a-fore-b3440
64.html (contending that through symbolic gestures and conciliatory foreign policy, President
Obama has made significant progress in improving international opinion toward the United
States).
165 See Chayes, supra note 158, at 74 (arguing that an act of unsigning will lead to a
significant breakdown of cooperation with allies by engendering deep resentment); see also
Daniel W. Drezner, Dubya's Gift, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 7, 2008), http://www.newsweek.com/id/
168093 (contending that President Obama will not be burdened by the international opinion
problems of the Bush administration if the President avoids missteps on important symbolic
issues).
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requirements of Article VI may make the act of unsigning the CTBT illegal.
American domestic law is also a significant obstacle. The possession of the
CTBT by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee currently precludes
unsigning the document and prospects for a resolution returning the Treaty
appear slim. Finally, even if all of these hurdles were overcome, policy
considerations suggest that unsigning the Treaty is unadvisable.
Decisions cannot be made in a vacuum. Even assuming that deterrence
advocates are correct in their assessment of the need for resumed nuclear
testing, this concern has relevance only if the United States can legally test
nuclear weapons in the absence of ratifying the CTBT. Because this very
possibly is not the case, opponents of the CTBT should reconsider this
rationale for rejecting the Treaty.
